Research

Abstract: This paper proposes that the failure of institutional transplants may stem from an 'institutional mismatch' between rigid formal rules and informal norms. Leveraging a spatial RD across partitioned ethnic homelands, I find that historical kinship intensity impedes development only under Civil Law. This institutional mismatch reduces local economic activity by 11% and aggregate GDP by 4%. Using geocoded microdata, I provide evidence that under Civil Law, high-kinship groups view the state as illegitimate, amounting to a deficit in institutional trust equivalent to half the aggregate variation across Sub-Saharan countries. Applying NLP to a novel corpus of colonial court cases, I show that Common Law can absorb customary norms, mitigating these costs. To address colonial strategy as an alternative explanation, I exploit a real-time shock in institutional mismatch during the 2016 Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon. The sudden imposition of Civil Law reduced economic activity four times as much in high-kinship communities. Institutional efficacy may depend on aligning formal policies with local moral psychology.